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As the lack of sufficient information for the calculation of the price index is 
generally known, the ECB no longer sets the objective of achieving the statistical 
annual rate of zero per cent of price increase but aims for an annual increase of 
slightly less than two per cent. The task of the ECB is symmetrical by nature – both 
too high and too low inflation rates should be avoided. In reality, the rate of 
appreciation has remained considerably below the desired level for several months 
in the European Economic and Monetary Union and this development is continuing. 
The same also applies to the base inflation rate, i.e. without taking into consideration 
developments in energy and food prices. The reasons are besides the continuing 
stagnation of labour productivity also the decline in economic activity since 2009 
and the related decrease in demand – particularly in the euro zone countries affected 
by crisis – adjustment of excessively high prices in certain countries and the 
continuing decline in oil prices and cheaper energy imports. The decreasing distance 
to the zero level at which – generally speaking – the so-called disinflation becomes 
deflation, is stirring up the sometimes very controversial discussions on urgently 
necessary investments that the ECB should make and on its role as the guardian of 
the currency. 
 
Deflation is a continuous process, so the issue is not just about temporary falling 
prices. Its characteristic signs are decreasing GDP growth rates, increase in 
unemployment, salary cuts and the resulting spiral of price changes heading below 
the above-mentioned zero level. Real interest rates are increasing. Such a situation is 
particularly problematic for such enterprises and households which have a high debt 
burden to begin with. If the continuation of the decrease in prices is confirmed, the 
demand will be increasingly put off to future periods and the pressure on prices will 
increase. This trend will restrict the conclusion of contracts according to which the 
decrease in prices will lead to an increase in real burdens. For instance, loan 
contracts and contracts of employment, considering the servicing of loans and 
personnel expenses. Disinflation, on the other hand, only means a decreasing rate of 
price increases (second derivative!), i.e. a statistically established decrease in 
inflation.  
When looking at the European Economic and Monetary Union as a whole without 
taking into account special situations in certain countries, the main objective first of 
all is to stop disinflationary developments in order to prevent the first signs of 
sliding into an economic depression. For that purpose, the ECB takes above all the 
following measures which have given rise to quite a few heated disputes:  
 lowering of base interest rates; 
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 quantitative easing (QE): it consists in the purchasing of loans, mortgage-
backed notes (real estate backed notes and also asset-backed securities 
(ABS)) by the ECB. If these transactions are performed with government 
loans acquired by the ECB in trading markets, it is called quantitative easing 
through outright monetary transactions (OMT). Quantitative easing can be 
used when the central bank has reduced base interest rates to zero or an even 
lower level and needs to continue expansive monetary policy to support the 
economic situation. Transactions of this type serve their purpose when the 
functioning of the chain of monetary policy is ensured. The impaired 
functioning of the transmission process between issuing banks, credit 
institutions and real economy has to be restored. Through purchases, the 
claims of the current holders of different notes that would be payable 
sometime in the future are turned into liquidity that can be used now. In 
other words: tied-up equity is released. Commercial banks are able to issue 
more loans and have more opportunities to acquire funds;  
 targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO) with the initial 
duration of three years1 and now four years. 
 
The main reason why economic recovery has not been achieved until now is the 
excessive loan burden in most countries of the eurozone. Many companies, 
households and also certain EU Member States have set themselves the goal of 
reducing their high debt burden. But this also reduces the demand, and enterprises 
tend to receive less orders. On the other hand, commercial banks – bearing in mind 
the lack of equity in balance sheets with risky assets – are issuing less loans. Summa 
summarum, more debts are currently repaid than acquired. Thus it is understandable 
that the ECB has lowered base interest rates as much as possible, made borrowing 
conditions easier and uses longer repayment periods. In addition, the central bank is 
ready to reduce the loan burdens in the balance sheets of banks and open 
possibilities for issuing more loans through programmes for purchasing of loans. 
It is questionable to what extent it is possible at all to direct the development of real 
economy in the current economic conditions with measures of monetary policy 
implemented so far and planned for the future. It is not certain at all that expansive 
monetary policy would induce European banks issue more loans and encourage 
enterprises, on the other hand, to borrow more for innovation and investments to 
enliven the economic situation. In principle, additional economic growth cannot be 
created by only measures of monetary policy just because of favourable 
development of financing opportunities. Monetary policy cannot remain successful 
without comprehensive reforms (above all flexible labour markets, reduction of 
bureaucracy, taxation systems favouring economic growth) or government policy 
focused on infrastructure, education, research and innovative investments, also 
online services2. 
                                                 
1 The TLTRO measures applied at the end of 2011 and beginning of 2012 in the amount of 
approximately one trillion were called „Big Bertha“ according to a large cannon used in World 
War I. 
2 Similar to Digital Agenda (Digitalen Agenda) in Germany. 
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The aim of the ECB policy is to change the current direction of price developments 
to bring the inflation rate back to an average level of a little less than two per cent. 
Therefore the ECB lowered on 5 June 2014 again to minus 0.2% the discount rate it 
had lowered to minus 0.1 per cent already in June 2013. Negative discount rate 
means in a sense charging penalty interest on funds deposited with the ECB. This is 
in principle similar to a tax charged on bank deposits. This is intended to encourage 
banks to issue more loans to real economy. This, however, assumes in its turn that 
banks are able to bear the risks related to issuing of loans and are ready for that. But 
this is not the case everywhere in the eurozone. Another objective is to induce banks 
with excessive liquidity to display more readiness for transferring such funds 
through interbank market to the disposal of credit institutions with insufficient 
potential for deposit creation. 
It is questionable whether banks will comply with the ECB wishes in the current 
situation, bearing in mind penalty interest rates. Negative base interests rates may 
lead to undesirable responses instead – banks will namely begin to avoid the 
direction set by the central bank. Firstly, banks may transfer the extra costs to their 
clients in the form of higher loan interests rates (and bank charges) which would not 
be appropriate at all in the current economic situation. Secondly, banks may see the 
way out in early repayment of expensive loans to reduce their balance with the 
central bank, instead of increasing the funds in circulation by issuing new loans. In 
addition it should be born in mind that negative deposit interest rates may affect the 
impact of direct transactions performed for monetary policy reasons within 
quantitative easing programmes. This will happen when banks are unable to use the 
revenue earned from the sale of government notes for issuing loans which are 
justified in their opinion but have to “park” the revenues temporary at the central 
bank, paying penalty interest rates for that. 
According to Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, the ECB is not 
allowed to perform national financing. In that sense, the central bank is not allowed 
to take over national loans directly from the issuer. The issue of whether the central 
bank violates the provisions of Article 123 also by acquiring national debt from 
aftermarkets has caused controversial discussions. As such direct transactions of 
monetary policy do not directly increase national budgets, this is in principle not 
regarded as national financing. The aim of direct transactions is just to reduce the 
interest rates paid on notes by the respective governments and thus to help them to 
acquire new loans from capital markets. 
In May 2010 the then President of the ECB Jean-Claude Trichet gave in to the 
pressure of the Member States and declared its intention to purchase the national 
debt of countries in crisis through the quantitative easing programme through third 
markets in unlimited amounts. The aim of this measure was to stop the 
disintegration of the Monetary Union. Already the announcement of such a purchase 
programme lowered the risk premiums of loans of problematic countries. The 
countries which were not included in the support programme did not, however, 
particularly like the planned selective implementation of the intervention measures. 
Besides there was some apprehension that countries in crisis may no longer feel the 
pressure or make efforts to reduce the national debt or implement systematic 
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structural reforms or at least do not perceive a sufficiently strong pressure. However, 
it would be absolutely necessary to carry out thorough adjustments in such countries 
to achieve their economic recovery within the European Union. 
The Governing Council of the ECB adopted the expanded quantitative easing 
programme on 22 January 2015. According to this programme, in addition to other 
programmes already started,3 government loans with good rating4 can be taken off 
the market from March 2015 to initially until September 2016, using 60 billion euros 
of the ECB funds monthly. The total amount for this period is 1.14 trillion euros. 
The plan described is considerably different from the conception declared in 2010 as 
funds will not be used selectively any more for the purchasing of government debt 
of countries in crises. Instead, all member states are involved now in the programme. 
Consequently, it was necessary to determine first the criteria for the distribution of 
the liquidity added to the market among government notes of different countries. 
The key to such distribution will eventually determine which countries will benefit 
most from the purchase programme, or, in other words – the national governments 
for which the financing conditions are most favourable ceteris paribus (other 
conditions being equal).  
Two methods of distribution were discussed: either distribution on the basis of 
shares of each member state in the ECB (equity) – in principle, according to the 
economic capacity of each Member State – or distribution according to the total 
volume of outstanding government debt capitalised through the market (market 
depth). Decision-makers must have seen clearly possible spillover effects of one or 
the other key of distribution that would not necessary contribute to the achievement 
of the objective. The Governing Council of the ECB decided to follow the 
participation in the ECB capital in the distribution. Purchasing of notes without any 
upper limits which would take into account the specific situation in different 
countries would have led to the payment of the largest parts of the programme 
volume to Member States with strong economy, such as Germany. Consequently, 
the interest burden of these countries would have decreased more than that of 
economically much weaker countries. In order to avoid that, the central bank will 
purchase no more than 33 per cent of the outstanding national debt of each country. 
The decision of the ECB to allow central banks of the Member States to purchase 
government notes and have them bear the risk of losses violates the rules of common 
monetary policy. Such policy is namely based on the principle of joint liability. With 
the renationalisation of liability risk the monetary policy is increasingly approaching 
financial policy. However, the fact that countries suffering from excessive debt 
burden – which is the whole point of the matter – no longer sufficiently perceive the 
controlling effect of loan risk charges, has an even more important impact. 
In order to alleviate such unwanted effect even to some extent, according to the 
Governing Council of the ECB, 20 per cent of loans purchased from open markets 
will still be subject to joint liability, and ECB in its turn will assume 8 per cent of 
                                                 
3 Such as mortgage-backed notes and credit-backed securities. 
4 Also issuers implementing programmes of EU institutions and support programmes. 
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the risk for the volume of purchases. The central banks of the Member States will 
bear the remaining 80 per cent of the risk. This means that the taxpayers of each 
Member State eventually take the responsibility as they can be regarded as the 
'passive owners' of the central bank of their country5.  
With an additional decision that loans would only be purchased from countries 
which comply with their contractual obligations according to the decision of the 
Council of the EU, the Governing Council of the ECB could have expressed more 
clearly the absolute necessity of structural reforms and lay an even stronger 
emphasis on this admonishing appeal. It would surely have increased the willingness 
of the countries concerned to implement measures oriented to the future. This, 
however, raises the issue that the ECB could have exceeded the limits of its 
competence by influencing such decisions which do not directly concern the 
financial area. Evaluating the conformity of the ECB measures with basic principles 
of monetary policy, a fundamental issue arises: what is monetary policy and what 
are its limits?  
Bearing in mind the quantitative easing programmes, we have to clarify another 
particularly important issue. Should the ECB be allowed to purchase also asset-
backed securities (ABS) besides notes with ordinary guarantees and transparent 
notes? Such notes are based on numerous loans of similar type which have very 
different guarantees. The problem with loan packages is that the guarantees of their 
different parts have been insufficiently documented and are therefore difficult to 
assess. Such complex financial instruments make it possible not only to diversify but 
also to hide the risks. Extremely risky U.S. mortgage claims sold internationally but 
poorly documented and wrongly assessed led to the catastrophe caused in 2008 by 
subprime loans, which grew into the global financial and economic crisis. Since then 
such loan packages are no longer trusted and have acquired the image of “toxic 
securities” or “securities from hell” or even “weapons of mass destruction”. As they 
can be abused, so-to-say, to obtain new liquidity at any time, purchasing ABS 
securities by the ECB means a special risk for the European Union which is known 
to be liable for the ECB. Thus we will reach again the community of taxpayers from 
all Member States. Therefore the ECB which acts in public interests should be 
allowed to purchase only simple and transparent premium securities with the lowest 
risk (senior tranches). ABS securities, on the other hand, are extremely complex and 
untransparent as they contain a large number of notes of different quality. The 
probability of default risk of such security packages can be assessed at best only the 
bank which has compiled them. And this only in case the bank is aware of the 
concentration and correlation risks between the loans within the package. Therefore 
it is difficult for potential buyers to recognize the ABS securities with a high default 
risk (mezzanine tranches). 
At the beginning of 2011 the targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO) 
started with the aim of facilitating the performance of the main duties of banks – 
namely supplying enterprises with external capital – in increasingly more regions. 
                                                 
5 See this train of thought in: Sinn, Hans-Werner, Europas Schattenbudget, Deutsches 
Handelsblatt, 09.02.2015, p. 48. 
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Local companies of Southern Europe in particular require generous loans. This 
depends not only on the capacity, i.e. the ability of a bank to create deposits, but also 
on its willingness. Banks accept loan applications only from applicants with 
sufficient payment capacity. Improvement of payment capacity is not the task of 
monetary policy. It can be globally influenced through financial policy at best 
through making the respective changes in the economic environment. 
In the current economic situation it seems to many credit institutions more profitable 
and considerably less risky to refinance their activities with long-term loans 
(TLTRO) and thus to purchase national debt with high interest rates or repay 
expensive bank loans instead of issuing additional loans to enterprises. So it is not 
surprising that the first “round” of intermediation of loans of targeted longer-term 
refinancing operations (TLTRO) in 2011 and 2012 did not achieve its objective. 
Therefore the loans of targeted longer-term refinancing operations will be issued in 
the future with the condition that banks should increase their existing volume of 
loans according to the volume of long-term loans issued (funding for lending). In 
parallel with this decision the periods of such loans of the central bank have been 
extended from three to four years. This, however, applies only if the volume of loans 
increased through loans of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO) is 
retained during that period. Otherwise the loans will have to be repaid in already two 
years. 
It is quite questionable whether the objective of the measure will also be achieved 
this way. Like before, banks can use funds of targeted longer-term refinancing 
operations (TLTRO) for purchasing government debt and simply repay to the ECB 
the loans two years later. If it is intended to stop the behaviour countering the actual 
objective of the measure, much tougher conditions should be imposed on the 
granting of loans. For instance, one possibility would be to require actual evidence 
on the purposeful use of the funds according to strict requirements. Also penalty 
interest rates could be imposed. Neither precaution has been planned for now. Thus 
banks will not be expected to provide at least a part of the liquidity to the disposal of 
enterprises and households. Consequently we cannot very much hope that the 
decrease in the volume of loans in eurozone could be stopped according to the 
expectations of the ECB.  
Although the external value of currency is not among the possible objectives of the 
central bank policy, the exchange rate may contribute to the positive effect of the 
current ECB policy after all. As the euro liquidity interest rates of banks are 
extremely low or even penalty interest rates are applied, the investment of capital 
outside the eurozone is constantly increasing. The subsequent decline in the 
exchange rate of the common currency generally increases the competitiveness of 
local enterprises, however. Such trend is supported by the preparations of the U.S.A. 
and U.K. for starting changes in the development of interest rates during this year. If 
this in its turn boosts export volumes, the economic measures initiated can still stop 
the price decrease trends. 
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Decreasing interest rates have an impact on the economic situation of enterprises not 
only in the same direction with the change (i.e. decrease) in exchange rates. They 
have a both positive and negative impact also through costs and equity quota. 
Decreasing interest rates have a positive impact on the costs of external financing 
also when existing loans with higher interest rates are repaid with new loan contracts 
with lower interest rates. On the other hand, also the discount rate is lower with 
decreasing market interest rates, and this determines the present value of long-term 
obligations required for the second column of the pension programme financed by 
enterprises. The lower is this rate, the higher is the present value of payments made 
by an enterprise for the financing of the second pension column of its staff. This in 
its turn forces enterprises to form considerably larger reserves in the balance sheet 
and this reduces the position of the equity.  
The decision of the Governing Council of the ECB of 22 January 2015 to bring 
additional 1.1 trillion euros to the financial markets within the next 19 months will 
lead to fast appreciation of assets as we see according to the developments in the 
U.S.A., U.K. and Japan. Such developments are also supported by the ECB 
purchases and therefore there will be even less attractive investment opportunities. 
Such developments will benefit segments of the population who are already wealthy 
and have a lot of real estate and rich security resources. On the other hand, bearing 
in mind actual decrease in the value of money, low interest rates are a disadvantage 
for individuals who have deposited euros for their old age pension. A long period of 
low interest rates may increasingly aggravate social gaps. 
Low interest rates have also an impact on banks which are mainly engaged in 
classical deposit and loan activities.6 Decreasing margins between the interests of 
creditors and debtors are the reason why it becomes increasingly difficult for such 
banks to earn reasonable profits. This may induce them to focus more on the risky 
areas of investment banking in their future activities. Also life insurance companies 
which had earlier invested the insurance premiums paid by clients largely in long-
term government debts, have increasing difficulties with providing attractive profit 
to their clients during a longer period of low interest rates. Therefore also such 
companies may become increasingly venturesome in investing the funds entrusted to 
them. It is planned to stop such a trend with the Solvency II capital standard which 
is a development of the currently effective strict capital rules of 73/239/EEC and 
will enter into force in the whole Europe in 2016. This will require insurance 
companies to secure risky transactions with more capital. 
The Bank for International Settlements is worried that extremely low interest rates 
may cause excesses in financial and real estate markets and admonishes central 
banks not to delay stopping their expansive monetary policy but start preparations 
for it and start it as soon as possible. If this is started too late, there may be not 
enough scope for monetary policy during the next recession for countermeasures 
accompanying fiscal policy. It has been noticed even now that the funds released are 
not used in real economy but are starting to create “bubbles“ in financial markets. 
                                                 
6 In Germany these are above all savings banks and cooperative banks (Sparkassen und 
Genossenschafts-banken). 
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Be that as it may, we can still state about the eurozone – in the current situation 
where we have a general economic recession are there is no particular hope for the 
rise in prices, the expansive monetary policy is in principle still justified for now. 
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